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The Slaveries of Sex, Race, and Mind:
Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Lady Byron Vindicated
By T. Austin Graham
Harriet Beecher Stowe’s notorious 1869 exposé, “The True Story of Lady Byron’s Life,” has quite plausibly been described as “the most sensational magazine article of the nineteenth 
century,”1 but as is often the case with sensations it has tended to be 
talked about much more than understood. Stowe’s nominal project in 
the “True Story” was the defense of the poet Lord Byron’s wife against 
criticism levied against her in the British and American press both before 
and after her death in 1860, and she continued advocating on her behalf 
the following year in a subsequent, stand-alone treatment titled Lady 
Byron Vindicated (1870). Her larger aim, however, was to strike a blow 
in the service of women’s rights, with Stowe attempting in her Byron 
studies to refine her earlier thinking about the institution of slavery 
and to expand its definition in such a way that it could be applied to 
the condition of women in the United States and elsewhere. But her 
project’s fate is a textbook illustration of the grievous consequences 
that can occur when an example used in the service of an argument 
overshadows the argument itself, as it was the inflammatory means by 
which Stowe made her point that received the most attention during 
her lifetime and afterwards. 
First aired in America’s Atlantic Monthly and England’s MacMillan’s, 
Stowe’s polemic could not have been better designed to provoke contro-
versy. The “True Story” proclaimed in a public forum the long-whispered 
rumor that Lord Byron had carried on an incestuous affair with his half 
sister and had fathered a daughter by her, and the reaction was swift, 
angry, and damaging for nearly everyone involved. Partisans of Lord 
Byron and defenders of his memory were predictably incensed, claiming 
that the story would permanently besmirch his reputation and that his 
wife had fed it to Stowe out of disloyalty and deceit. A large contingent 
of Stowe’s audience was horrified that she would so exceed the bound-
aries of propriety and pollute mainstream publications with salacious 
subject matter, with fifteen thousand of the Atlantic’s subscribers (about 
one third of the readership) canceling in protest and almost wrecking 
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the magazine in what Oliver Wendell Holmes dubbed “the Byron whirl-
wind.”2 And Stowe, who was of course no stranger to controversy, stood 
to lose a great deal. The Atlantic survived and the poet’s work ended 
up suffering little in its popularity and critical esteem, but Stowe’s ca-
reer was not the same after 1870. Forrest Wilson, one of Stowe’s early 
biographers, despaired in 1941 that after the Byron affair, “Never again 
would she stand alone as the supreme female figure in the American 
scene. . . . Today with the millions the most conspicuous and influential 
American woman of the 1850’s and 1860’s is but a name—the author 
of Uncle Tom’s Cabin—she who deserved to be remembered for so much 
else.”3 Stowe’s later writing, of course, now has a more secure place in 
the academy than it did when Wilson wrote her literary obituary, but 
the sheer peculiarity of the imbroglio still lingers: why would the author 
of the nineteenth century’s best-selling novel jeopardize her career in 
such spectacular fashion, airing an allegation that was all but certain to 
inflame the public and yet was unlikely to benefit anyone other than 
Lady Byron, a woman whom Stowe considered a friend but who had 
been dead for nearly a decade?
Until relatively recently, scholars who discussed Stowe’s Byron texts 
mainly concerned themselves with the veracity of their allegations and 
the motivations that led Stowe to make them, with most concluding 
either that she made a fool of herself or that Lady Byron rather craft-
ily took advantage of her. Biographies of the poet have varied a great 
deal over the years, but one constant has been the tendency to dismiss 
Stowe as a hack and to treat Lady Byron’s collaboration with her as an 
expression of vanity and revenge: in 1925, John Drinkwater called Lady 
Byron Vindicated “one of the most nauseating essays in sanctimony that 
has ever been written”; in 1970, Leslie A. Marchand deemed Stowe’s 
account of the controversy “garbled”; and in 2002, Fiona MacCarthy 
included an unflattering photograph of Lady Byron in her Byron: Life and 
Legend, a caption declaring that she “devoted herself to self-justification 
and philanthropy” in her final years.4 In Americanist circles, meanwhile, 
twentieth-century studies of Stowe’s Byron texts were for quite some 
time essentially speculative, taking quasi-psychoanalytical form as critics 
attempted to make sense of her baffling professional decision. In years 
past some of her theorized motives for writing Lady Byron Vindicated have 
included a desire to boast of her connections to the English aristocracy, 
a hope of making money by exploiting a celebrity, and, most eyebrow 
raising of all, a peculiar kind of crush on Byron himself, a simultane-
ous attraction to and repulsion from a bad-boy literary idol left over 
from her schoolgirl days.5 In many ways, then, the conversation about 
Stowe and the sensation she caused has gone on as it always has, with 
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commentators on both sides of the Atlantic sharing a certain disbelief 
at her audacity and a need to make sense of it.
Such reactions are to be expected, given Stowe’s sordid subject matter, 
but they tend to distract attention from the forceful claims about gender 
and social marginalization that she makes in Lady Byron Vindicated, with 
this oversight being no less pressing for Stowe’s having more or less 
brought it upon herself. Only recently have scholars been able to get 
beyond the text’s lurid claims about the Byron marriage and consider 
what the couple’s relationship might have represented to Stowe more 
broadly, with a handful of investigations having uncovered Stowe’s im-
plicit arguments about the female voice, the burden of authorial proof, 
and transatlantic readership.6 But perhaps the most compelling char-
acterization of Lady Byron Vindicated has also been the least explored: 
the biographer Joan D. Hedrick’s suggestion that Stowe intended it to 
be “the Uncle Tom’s Cabin of sexual slavery,”7 an explosive portrait of a 
famous female victim whose example would help correct a pervasive 
and institutional abrogation of women’s rights. The term “slavery” in 
connection with the brief and unhappy Byron marriage might from 
the outside seem something of an overstatement on Hedrick’s part, 
but Stowe deploys or implies it at several points throughout Lady Byron 
Vindicated and appears to mean it quite literally. As Stowe put it in a let-
ter to Horace Greeley, Lady Byron’s sad life had for her come to typify 
“the old idea of woman: that is, a creature to be crushed and trodden 
under foot whenever her fate and that of a man come in conflict.”8 What 
is more, Stowe had recently found a new way of framing and criticiz-
ing this “old idea” thanks to John Stuart Mill’s The Subjection of Women 
(1869), which had appeared in the same year as the “True Story” and 
provocatively conflated the institution of marriage with that of chattel 
slavery. And if ever there were a writer capable of considering the condi-
tion of women in relation to theories of enslavement it would be Stowe, 
whose novels of the 1850s were instantly recognized as monuments of 
abolitionist literature. 
One of the peculiarities of Lady Byron Vindicated and its place in Ameri-
can literary studies, however, is that scholars have made precious few 
attempts at connecting Stowe’s treatment of the “slavery” Lady Byron is 
alleged to have suffered with race slavery of the sort found in Stowe’s 
other works. Stowe’s ridiculers in the cartooning community certainly 
had no compunctions about broaching the subject while the Byron 
controversy was raging, caricaturing the affair by playing up the incon-
gruous, presumably comic juxtaposition of a conspicuously whitened 
Byron with leering, pitch-black characters from Stowe’s novels. Men 
of letters did the same: Charles Mackay’s 1869 biography of Medora 
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Leigh (the daughter produced by Byron’s alleged incest) speculated 
that Lady Byron had attracted Stowe’s attention in part because she was 
active in abolitionist circles and was therefore “what the Americans call 
a nigger-worshipper.”9 Still others speculated, somewhat gleefully, that 
the American Civil War and the end of the most obvious depredations 
of chattel slavery had robbed Stowe of her most reliable and best-selling 
subject matter, leaving her unable to make fiction out of what one scholar 
has termed “the difficult and unglamorous problems of reconstruction” 
and leading her to defame Byron out of desperation.10
But all this nastiness aside, sustained critical attention to Stowe’s 
earlier concern with emancipation and American slavery can make her 
decision to leap to Lady Byron’s defense seem considerably less odd 
than it otherwise might. Her treatment of the poet’s wife has often 
struck readers as a departure from the social and political concerns 
of her 1850s fiction, but putting Lady Byron Vindicated into conversa-
tion with Stowe’s antebellum, racially oriented works not only makes 
it seem more of a piece with her previous career, but also reveals a 
more expansive, even philosophical understanding on her part as to 
what “slavery” entails. Exploring Stowe’s ideas about race and sexual 
subjugation through the prism of Lady Byron Vindicated puts her in the 
company of such metaphysically minded writers as Frederick Douglass, 
Henry David Thoreau, and even Byron himself, all of whom understood 
slavery to be an institution of the mind as well as a matter of public 
policy, its tyrannical masters found, as Thoreau put it, everywhere from 
Mississippi to Massachusetts, enslaving “understandings and consciences” 
in addition to black bodies.11 Far from a mere exercise in literary score 
settling or sensationalism, Lady Byron Vindicated advances a conception 
of slavery that goes beyond legal and social conditions and defines it 
as a way of thinking, with Stowe arguing that women can as a sex be 
enslaved in much the same way that Africans once were as a race, and 
worse, that women can be complicit in the act of enslavement by enslav-
ing themselves. Indeed, one of the ironies of this text is the fact that 
the extraordinary controversy that has surrounded it over the years has 
had so little to do with its feminism—a feminism so radical that, had it 
not been overshadowed by Stowe’s invocation of scandal, might have 
caused every bit as much of an uproar in its time.
***
The evolution of Stowe’s thinking on the subject of sexual slavery 
is best illustrated by the differences between her magazine and book 
treatments of the Byron affair, which, when taken together, illustrate a 
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growing sense on her part that Lady Byron was an especially prominent 
victim of a broader male conspiracy against all of womankind. In the 
“True Story,” Stowe’s claims are comparatively modest, mostly in rela-
tion to the question of whether and how women ought to go about 
defending themselves and their family members in public. Perhaps 
the most notable quality of Lady Byron that emerges in this account 
is her unfailing discretion, with Stowe depicting her as a woman who 
took refuge in a “perfect silence” after she and her husband separated 
in 1816 and who refrained from responding to the many attacks that 
were subsequently levied against her in print—attacks that, according to 
Stowe, frequently came from Byron himself.12 Much of the first half of 
the “True Story” finds Stowe engaging in literary exegesis, quoting and 
condemning lengthy passages of Byron’s poetry that are alleged to be 
an insulting commentary on his wife. While Stowe’s doing so invites the 
charge that she has failed to recognize, as Peter W. Graham has put it, 
that much of Byron’s work depends upon “fiction-making that braids or 
weaves two or more realities into a whole that resists reduction into any 
one of its component strands,” her portrait of Lady Byron is neverthe-
less one of extraordinary forbearance.13 And yet, Stowe writes, even this 
forbearance has been twisted into a fault by her detractors, with a recent 
memoir by Byron’s mistress—the Countess Guiccioli—dwelling “with a 
peculiar bitterness on Lady Byron’s entire silence” during the years in 
which the poet became an infamous public figure and was himself in 
need of defenders (TS 532, emphasis in original). For Stowe, the irony 
is simply too cruel: Lady Byron’s unwillingness to damage her husband’s 
already-shaky reputation has been transformed into an act of disloyalty, 
“the most aggravated form of persecution and injury” (TS 532). 
Then, about halfway through the “True Story,” Stowe drops her bomb-
shell, making for one of the most extraordinary instances of “burying 
the lead” in all of American literary history:
From the height at which he might have been happy as the husband of a noble 
woman, he fell into the depths of a secret adulterous intrigue with a blood 
relation, so near in consanguinity that discovery must have been utter ruin and 
expulsion from civilized society.
From henceforth, this damning guilty secret became the ruling force in his life, 
holding him with a morbid fascination, yet filling him with remorse and anguish 
and insane dread of detection. (TS 542)
Stowe may not have realized just how inflammatory this claim would 
turn out to be, for in the “True Story” it is essentially a supporting detail, 
an occasion for her to illustrate the superior character of Lady Byron, 
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the grace with which she handled her husband’s “secret adulterous 
intrigue,” and the generosity of her never having revealed the truth. 
The poet, Stowe writes, was torn “between angel and devil” throughout 
his life, but his wife was entirely committed to saving his soul, showing 
“that immortal kind of love such as God feels for the sinner,—the love 
of which Jesus spoke” (TS 545–46). This eminently Christian goodness, 
Stowe argues, was in part a consequence of Lady Byron’s “heroic self-
abnegation and self sacrifice” (TS 555), her determination to put aside 
her own injuries (no matter how painful) in order to ease her husband’s 
torment (no matter how self-inflicted). But even more importantly, Lady 
Byron’s unwillingness to denounce her husband’s crime is presented not 
as a consequence of doctrinal obedience or wifely obligation, but rather 
as the manifestation of unusual strength. Stowe’s Byron is tragically 
divided and utterly confined by his wicked impulses, whereas her Lady 
Byron is a divine liberator: “Her love was never the doting fondness of 
weak women; it was the appreciative and discriminating love by which 
a higher nature recognized godlike capabilities under all the dust and 
defilement of misuse and passion” (TS 557).
As introduced in the “True Story,” then, Lady Byron is an object of 
admiration rather than of pity, with her silence represented as stoicism 
and her charity as munificence. But the outcry that followed the article’s 
publication forced Stowe to take a very different tack as she expanded 
on and clarified her claims the following year in Lady Byron Vindicated. 
Here Stowe relies considerably more on evidence and documentation 
than she does on character analysis, including a voluminous array of 
articles, letters, literary works, and other commentary related to the affair. 
Stowe also writes with a more defensive tone, justifying her involvement 
in the case with nearly as much fervor as she declaims Lady Byron’s 
virtue. Most importantly of all, however, Lady Byron Vindicated is broader 
in scope and intention than the “True Story,” with Stowe concerned 
not only with the Byron marriage but also with a transatlantic “slavery 
for women” that she believes the affair has brought to light.14 Stowe’s 
broader intentions are evident at the very beginning of her book: to 
those critics who have argued that her previous article had failed as a 
“literary effort,” she asks, “Are the cries of the oppressed, the gasps of 
the dying, the last prayers of mothers,— are any words wrung like drops 
of blood from the human heart to be judged as literary efforts?” (LB 
4, emphasis in original) Stowe’s violent imagery and accusatory, direct 
mode of address should of course be familiar to anyone who has read 
the abolitionist pronouncements of Uncle Tom’s Cabin, and for Stowe the 
stakes in Lady Byron Vindicated are every bit as high. 
Stowe returns to the subject of Lady Byron’s silence in the first half 
of the text, but this time finds much larger and more sinister social 
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problems at play. Some of her points are relatively unremarkable, such 
as her assertion that sexual double standards obliged Lady Byron to 
remain quiet so as not to damage the woman who bore her husband’s 
child: “The world may finally forgive the man of genius anything,” Stowe 
observes, “but for a woman there is no mercy and no redemption” 
(LB 74). More notable is Stowe’s sense that the vilification Lady Byron 
endured after her separation was the result of her having been subject 
to a pervasive and unjust taboo, one holding that wives, even those in 
the most abusive of marriages, may not contest the wrongs they suffer 
at the hands of their husbands. Stowe recounts with particular fury 
the editorial attention that a rare statement of clarification from Lady 
Byron drew after Thomas Moore’s biography of the poet appeared in 
1830, with one representative article in Blackwood’s Magazine declaring 
that Lady Byron had, in asserting herself, trampled on “the rights of a 
husband to his wife’s silence when speech is fatal . . . to his character as 
a man” (LB 113). Even worse, in Stowe’s estimation, is the model that 
another writer suggests that Lady Byron ought to have followed instead, 
that of a local widow who declined repeatedly to cast aspersions on her 
husband after his death in spite of the fact that he had in life treated her 
with extraordinary violence and cruelty, even beating her while she was 
pregnant: “Nay, I remember once how her pale countenance reddened 
with a sudden flush of pride, when a gossiping crone alluded to their 
wedding . . . That, I say, sir, whether right or wrong, was—forgiveness” 
(LB 116, emphasis in original). As Stowe glosses this conversation, the 
outrage is not simply that these writers are suggesting that Lady Byron 
attempt to burnish her husband’s posthumous reputation but rather that 
they expect her to alter her inward, private estimation of him, that “this 
abused, desecrated woman must reverence her brutal master’s memory” 
(LB 117, emphasis in original). 
For Stowe, this doctrine of perpetual feminine silence and forgiveness 
is not only restrictive but also seems to demand outright masochism, 
as though the woman in question is somehow to enjoy the abuse she 
receives from her husband. The corrective image of femininity that Lady 
Byron’s detractors offer is, in Stowe’s words, that of 
helpless, cowering, broken-hearted, abject women, given over to the animal 
love which they share alike with the poor dog,—the dog, who, beaten, kicked, 
starved, and cuffed, still lies by his drunken master with great anxious eyes of 
love and sorrow, and with sweet, brute forgiveness nestles upon his bosom, as 
he lies in his filth in the snowy ditch, to keep the warmth of life in him. Great 
is the mystery of this fidelity in the poor, loving brute,—most mournful and 
most sacred! (LB 118) 
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Here and elsewhere, Stowe finds the construction of feminine false 
consciousness to be the greatest of all social outrages perpetuated on 
women and argues that it leads to “utter self-abnegation” (LB 138), a 
condition that in no way resembles the “heroic self-abnegation” that she 
had attributed to Lady Byron in her earlier article. There Lady Byron 
is presented in explicitly religious terms, but Lady Byron Vindicated is 
more concerned with the “patron saint” of femininity venerated by the 
masculine press, a woman whose state is described in such grotesquely 
unequal terms that she seems almost to have sprung from the pages 
of antebellum abolitionist literature. In Stowe’s words, the husband of 
such a woman “tears her from her children; he treats her with personal 
abuse; he repudiates her,—sends her out to nakedness and poverty; 
he installs another mistress in his house, and sends for the first to be 
her handmaid and his own: and all this the meek saint accepts” (LB 
138). And for Stowe, the danger is that these outrages will become all 
the more entrenched in England and America if so prominent and ac-
complished a woman as Lady Byron is silenced. “If the peeress as a wife 
has no rights,” she asks, “what is the state of the cotter’s wife?” (LB 120, 
emphasis in original)
It is worth pausing at this point to acknowledge the polemical, fre-
quently bombastic quality of Stowe’s language and to consider whether 
her comparison of even the most abused wife with that of an enslaved 
African is in fact reasonable. Certainly Stowe’s comparison is an extreme 
one, but by making it in Lady Byron Vindicated she entered a long-running 
conversation on women’s rights that had been unfolding—at least in 
America—for about forty years, one that routinely invoked the term 
“slavery” to describe the legally inferior condition of women. As virtually 
every history of the women’s rights movement notes, it was the antislav-
ery cause that gave American women their first, significant opportunity 
to engage in political advocacy, that provided them with a model of 
how such campaigns could be organized and operated, and that most 
importantly of all theorized a doctrine of higher laws and human rights 
that was quickly invoked in the service of other marginalized groups.15 
More than three decades before Lady Byron Vindicated, Angelina and 
Sarah Grimké advanced the notion that free women not only could 
empathize with African slaves but also were enslaved themselves, with 
Sarah declaring in 1838 that “it requires but little thought to see that 
the condition of women and that of slaves are in many respects paral-
lel.”16 Before long the woman-slave analogy was, according to Blanche 
Glassman Hersh, “the most frequently used feminist argument in the 
antebellum period,”17 and such rhetoric reached a high point in the 
“Declaration of Sentiments” drafted at the Seneca Falls Convention of 
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1848, which invoked Jeffersonian, emancipatory language in much the 
same way that Abraham Lincoln later would and declared: “The history 
of mankind is a history of repeated injuries and usurpations on the part 
of man toward woman, having in direct object the establishment of an 
absolute tyranny over her.”18 In subsequent decades it was almost de 
rigeur for Lucy Stone and other reformers to declare that “marriage is 
to woman a state of slavery,”19 and in so doing they laid the groundwork 
for Stowe’s defense of Lady Byron.
So too had other thinkers anticipated Stowe’s notion that the ulti-
mate product of sexual slavery is a warped feminine consciousness. 
Perhaps the most significant early articulation of such a theory was 
Mary Wollstonecraft’s Vindication of the Rights of Women (1792), a text 
that was somewhat in vogue at the time of Lady Byron Vindicated, thanks 
to its having been serialized in the American feminist journal Revolution 
in 1868. Among other things, Wollstonecraft argues in the Vindication 
that Western society seeks “to enslave women by cramping their under-
standings and sharpening their senses,” subjecting them to a regimen 
of indoctrination that deadens their mental faculties, intensifies their 
sensual urges, and produces submissive creatures beholden not just 
to men but also to their own degraded appetites. “To their senses, are 
women made slaves,” Wollstonecraft declares, such that they come to 
“despise the freedom which they have not sufficient virtue to struggle 
to attain.”20 And while Wollstonecraft was too infamous a figure to be 
much invoked by feminists during the first half of the nineteenth cen-
tury, her notion that a person could be mentally enslaved even while 
enjoying legal freedom was routinely echoed in American intellectual 
circles, whether politically or philosophically. Thoreau would famously 
argue in 1854 that it is conventional wisdom, and not the government, 
that most often turns humanity into chattel, declaring that “the law will 
never make men free”21 and advancing an argument suggested in 1837 
by the title of Angelina Grimké’s Appeal to the Women of the Nominally Free 
States. Indeed, when thus expanded the term “slavery” could be made 
to apply to virtually any sentient person, such that nineteenth-century 
advocates for Native Americans, European immigrants, white laborers, 
and even free lovers could all claim those populations to have been 
“enslaved” in one way or another. Thus does Herman Melville’s Ishmael 
show himself to be very much a man of his era in posing his famous 
rhetorical question in Moby-Dick: “Who ain’t a slave?”22
Perhaps the single most important influence on Stowe’s thinking in 
Lady Byron Vindicated, however, was John Stuart Mill’s The Subjection of 
Women of 1869 and his contention therein that the same primitive desire 
for dominion that had produced African slavery was continuing, albeit 
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more insidiously, to characterize relations between the genders. As does 
Stowe, Mill argues that Western institutions of custom, education, and 
religion all are designed to rob women of their ability to ponder and 
question their status as second-class citizens, thereby bestowing upon 
men “not a forced slave but a willing one.”23 Indeed, Mill goes so far as 
to declare that sexual slavery is even more encompassing than the sort 
that had been practiced in the antebellum South, which, while more 
spectacular in its brutality, nevertheless left slaves with at least some de-
gree of privacy, “off duty” moments that could not be impinged upon. 
As Mill puts it: “‘Uncle Tom’ under his first master had his own life 
in his ‘cabin,’ almost as much as any man whose work takes him away 
from home, is able to have his own family. But it cannot be so with the 
wife.”24 Much of Mill’s argument on this score, of course, can be disputed, 
particularly his notion that marriage slavery is more totalizing than 
the racial variety because it has a built-in sexual component, requiring 
a “last familiarity” from wives that chattel slaves can refuse.25 But the 
important thing to grasp in The Subjection of Women is Mill’s belief that 
the degraded position of black chattel and that of the English wife dif-
fer only in degree and not in kind; as for Stowe, she credited Mill with 
making her thinking on gender relations “all clear,” and she appears to 
have brought his theorization of a mentally stunted female underclass 
to bear on her second, more expansive treatment of Lady Byron.26
Perhaps the most significant difference between Stowe’s “True Story” 
and Lady Byron Vindicated is her concern not just with the Byron marriage 
and its aftermath, but also with the larger process of socialization that it 
seems to reveal: those who would enforce Lady Byron’s silence are seek-
ing also to imbue her with “that utter deadness to the sense of justice which 
the laws, literature, and misunderstood religion of England have sought 
to induce in woman as a special grace and virtue” (LB 119, emphasis 
in original). Social institutions, and in particular the “misunderstood 
religion of England,” are for Stowe bent on forcing women to view them-
selves as a degraded sex and become their own, self-regulating captors, 
and it is on this subject that the connections between her conception of 
sexual slavery and the racial variety she had opposed nearly two decades 
earlier can be seen most clearly. Frederick Douglass, whom Stowe read 
and attempted to correspond with during the writing of Uncle Tom’s 
Cabin, had years before reached much the same conclusions about the 
psychological dimensions of the slavery he had suffered. He observes in 
his 1845 Narrative that “to make a contented slave, it is necessary to make 
a thoughtless one,” usually by a series of steps that not only force the 
slave to submit to a master’s will but more importantly convince him of 
the essential rightness of his enslavement.27 In Douglass’s theorization, 
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the completely mastered slave must believe that he is morally unfit for 
freedom, that his fate is best left in the hands of an enlightened other, 
and that Christianity reserves a special reward for those who suffer 
worldly torments; once this has been accomplished, the slave will rule 
himself far more sternly than any outside authority could. And it was the 
ignorance that had been systematically forced upon Southern blacks that 
gave Stowe her first opportunity to develop a broad conception of slavery 
that could later be applied to the condition of women, with her novels 
of the 1850s considering subjection in both its legal and metaphysical 
terms several years in advance of her encounter with Mill.
The influence of Douglass’s theorization of slavery on Stowe’s fiction 
is most obviously evident in her characterization of the perennially 
suffering, unerringly forgiving, and supremely Christian Uncle Tom, 
whose inflexibly doctrinal way of thinking—“confined entirely to the 
New Testament”28—produces in him a wellspring of love for those who 
own him and a comparative disregard for worldly justice insofar as it 
affects the master-slave relationship. Such assured and even enthusias-
tic martyrdom, of course, is precisely what has rendered Stowe’s novel 
uncomfortable for contemporary readers and made the name “Uncle 
Tom” synonymous with passivity, accommodation, and racial shame. 
But it is important to note that Stowe would in her later writings find 
such self-abasement—particularly when informed by religion—to be 
more disturbing than saintly, not only in regard to sex in Lady Byron 
Vindicated but also in her subsequent treatments of black slavery. Hence, 
her second novel Dred, the story of a slave conspiracy and uprising, is 
in many ways an extended meditation on the perversions Christianity 
suffers when used to justify slaveholding and on the pronounced intel-
lectual shuttering required if one is to believe that it is, in fact, God’s 
will that slaves serve their masters. For each African moved to a “higher 
piety” through Biblical instruction, Stowe observed in 1856, “thousands 
are crushed in hopeless imbecility,” rendered docile and even accepting 
of the outrages perpetuated on them.29 And if slavery’s most important 
hallmarks include a tendency towards self-restriction and self-deprecation 
in the slave, then it does not take too many associative steps to see how 
Stowe might eventually conclude that women—even so prominent a 
woman as Lady Byron—could suffer the fate that Africans had. 
The key question in Lady Byron Vindicated, then, is whether or not the 
object of its inquiry—a woman whom Stowe had praised the year before 
for her “heroic” silence and loyalty—had upon further reflection come 
to seem a slave instead. Put another way, have the men whom Stowe 
accuses of attempting to master Lady Byron succeeded? In the second 
half of the volume, Stowe provides a lengthy account of her personal 
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meetings, interviews, and correspondence with Lady Byron, and to 
some degree the portrait of her that emerges seems to indicate that 
she had in fact lived up to the standard of self-repressing femininity 
that Stowe now finds so objectionable. Lady Byron remains proud of 
her long-departed husband: “We talked for some time of him then; she 
with her pale face slightly flushed, speaking, as any other great man’s 
widow might, only of what was purest and best in his works, and what 
were his undeniable virtues and good traits, especially in early life” (LB 
218). She strikes Stowe as passive, “an interested spectator of the world’s 
affairs” instead of “an actor involved in its trials” (LB 206). And even in 
revealing the secret of her husband’s incest, she seems still to believe 
that it is improper of her to do so: “There was something awful to me in 
the intensity of repressed emotion which she showed as she proceeded,” 
Stowe writes (LB 235). 
The sticking point lies once more in the question of self-assertion, in 
whether or not Stowe now finds Lady Byron’s decision to be “a silent 
sufferer under calumny and misrepresentation” to be impressive or an 
exemplary expression of sexual slavery (LB 360). Certainly Lady Byron 
has not descended to the sickening, animalistic level that Stowe fears 
men would consign women to, but even the Byron defender Charles 
Mackay (he of the “nigger-worshipper” comment) had been taken aback 
by Stowe’s depiction of her in the MacMillan’s piece. If Stowe’s allega-
tions are in fact true, Mackay writes, then Lady Byron is a woman “so 
meek, so spiritless, so abject, so stupidly forgiving, so unconscious of the 
respect due to herself and to the outraged laws of God and man, that she 
preferred to be a dog sleeping at the door of an incestuous adulterer, 
rather than an honest and outraged woman.”30 Once more Lady Byron 
is faulted for failing to speak on her own behalf, and Stowe seems to 
support such criticism at points in Lady Byron Vindicated, arguing that 
utter self-abnegation has been preached to women as a peculiarly feminine virtue. 
It is true; but there is a moral limit to the value of self-abnegation.
It is a fair question for the moralist, whether it is right and proper wholly to ignore 
one’s personal claims to justice. The teachings of the Saviour give us warrant for 
submitting to personal injuries; but both the Saviour and St. Paul manifested 
bravery in denying false accusations, and asserting innocence. (LB 196)
Here and elsewhere, Stowe’s implications are stern indeed: by allowing 
herself to be the victim of injustice, Lady Byron could perhaps also be 
said to have become an instrument of it, as acquiescence and passivity 
are in Stowe’s estimation as often as not the moral equivalents of active 
support for an ideological position. Stowe even goes so far as to accuse 
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those Americans who have done nothing more than read rumors about 
Lady Byron in the print media of having been “betrayed into injustice, 
and a complicity with villainy,” and she will not allow the Byron contro-
versy to be treated simply as a case of one woman’s failing to protect her 
reputation (LB 194, 196). Rather, the principle at stake has an effect on 
women more broadly: “There are thousands of poor victims suffering 
in sadness, discouragement, and poverty” to whom Lady Byron’s testi-
mony “might bring courage and hope from springs not of this world” 
(LB 162–63). Lady Byron’s story, in other words, belongs not just to her 
but also to her sex, and her failure to defend herself is by extension a 
failure to defend women more broadly.
For Stowe, the mind-forged manacles that enslaved women and left 
them thoughtless participants in an unjust system could only be broken 
by active resistance, and to a point she is offering—she did in Uncle 
Tom’s Cabin—an iconic sufferer who is too weak for rebellion but who 
might be able to inspire it in others. Indeed, the tragedy of Lady Byron 
as presented in Lady Byron Vindicated is less that she has suffered abuse 
than that she aspires to a freedom of thought that she is ultimately too 
bound by convention and doctrine to attain. In some ways, Lady Byron 
is depicted as remarkably heterodox: at her most bold she tells Stowe, 
“I look upon creeds of all kinds as chains,—far worse chains than those 
you would break,—as the causes of much hypocrisy and infidelity” (LB 
210). But when all is said and done, she cannot bring herself to speak 
against her husband or on her own behalf, in spite of the fact that she 
recognizes, as Stowe paraphrases it, a “last duty which she might owe to 
abstract truth and justice in her generation” (LB 368). Stowe’s ultimate 
estimation of Lady Byron’s degree of “enslavement” is best expressed 
in the following:
Lady Byron’s hopes for her husband fastened themselves on all the noble frag-
ments yet remaining in that shattered temple of his mind which lay blackened 
and thunder-riven; and she looked forward to a sphere beyond this earth, where 
infinite mercy should bring all to symmetry and order. If the strict theologian 
must regret this as an undue latitude of charity, let it at least be remembered that 
it was a charity which sprang from a Christian virtue, and which she extended 
to every human being, however lost, however low. (LB 398–99)
In the end, Stowe’s Lady Byron is more an Uncle Tom than a Dred, 
but if she has not served the cause of highest justice by publishing her 
story herself, she has gone part of the way and given an intermediary 
the opportunity to do so in her stead. She did not defy those who 
sought to confine her, but neither could her condition be classed as 
total enslavement.
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Indeed, if there is a true slave to be found in this text it is not a 
woman, but rather the “master” himself, Lord Byron. For Stowe he is 
ultimately a figure of lost potential, a man who possessed the capacity 
to be a friend of universal liberty but was too shackled by worldly vice 
for his work or life to reflect it. Stowe notes in Lady Byron Vindicated that 
there has always been a “peculiarity in Lord Byron, that the pure and 
the impure in his poetry often ran side by side without mixing,” and 
for most of her life she seems to have understood him to represent an 
almost poignant failure of possibility (LB 397). The poet and his works 
were profoundly attractive to Stowe when she was a girl, but she would 
later remember that, upon Byron’s death in 1824, her father mourned 
his “wasted life and misused powers” and eulogized him thus: “I did hope 
he would live to do something for Christ. What a harp he might have 
swept!”31 Following Stowe’s lead, scholars have classified a great many 
characters in her novels as “Byronic” over the years, usually because they 
are impossibly divided between lofty principle and base actuality—for 
example, the sardonic Augustine St. Claire of Uncle Tom’s Cabin, a man 
who mocks the intellectual justifications of chattel slavery but is too 
unprincipled to free the slaves he owns. But perhaps nowhere is Stowe’s 
sense of Byron’s moral schizophrenia more evident than in Dred, a novel 
that she wrote around the time she made Lady Byron’s acquaintance and 
in which there seem to be two utterly opposite and yet entirely plausible 
versions of the poet. He first appears in the form of Edward Clayton, a 
young man who is “quite Byronic” in appearance and who devotes his 
law career to the cause of abolition.32 But he can also be found in the 
wicked Tom Gordon, a slaveholder who drinks away his time at univer-
sity, threatens to purchase and rape a slave married to his mulatto half-
brother, and, significantly, shares the surname of Lord Byron himself. 
These antithetical Byrons, when taken together, manifest the duality 
that Stowe had so often found in him, with the poet emerging at some 
points as a friend of liberty and at others as the product of a primitive 
and dying social order. And if Lady Byron Vindicated is any indication, it 
was the latter fate—that of the very worst kind of conventionality—that 
Stowe believed had ultimately befallen him.
There are a great many ironies implicit in Stowe’s project, among 
them the fact that her moral inflexibility rather uncomfortably resembles 
the rigid closed-mindedness that she identifies at the root of gender in-
equality. But perhaps most important of all are the myriad ways in which 
Stowe, by denouncing tyranny, winds up sounding like the very poet she 
condemns. Many of Byron’s poetical works contain a similar sense that 
it is in its thinking that humanity is most completely enslaved and that 
emancipation is a matter of the mind, but perhaps none does so more 
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effectively in the context of Lady Byron Vindicated than his verse drama 
Cain (which, as it happens, Stowe believed to have been motivated in part 
by Byron’s obsession with incest). Cain is introduced as a Promethean 
figure, a man told to be “cheerful and resign’d” in a postlapsarian world 
of toil but who yet desires to satisfy those “thoughts which arise within 
me, as if they / Could master all things.”33 God has left him in what the 
tempter Lucifer calls “a Paradise of Ignorance, from which / Knowledge 
was barr’d as poison”34 and so he abjures it, choosing to think freely 
and heretically even at the cost of having his progeny condemned to 
eternal labor—a divine sentence against one man’s subsequent race that 
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century proponents of African slavery often 
claimed to be carrying out, on the grounds that black skin was in fact the 
residual “mark of Cain.”35 For the contemporary novelist Charles John-
son, the rebelliousness that Byron attributes to Cain is in part a product 
of his despised “blackness,” but it is also in this crucible of slavery that 
modern thought is born. In Byron’s treatment, Johnson writes, “Western 
man himself was Cain, cursed with the burden of restlessness and the 
endless quest for selfhood.”36 And thus does Byron bring together many 
of the ideas that Stowe would grapple with fifty years later, questioning 
whether the act of enslavement can ever be completed unless the mind 
as well as the body has been mastered. 
In the end, it is difficult to reconcile the fact that Byron could at the 
same time be, as one scholar has put it, “the single greatest literary and 
imaginative influence on the writings of Harriet Beecher Stowe” and 
also one of her greatest villains.37 Understanding the figure of Byron 
as reflected in her works requires readers to think of him as both a 
champion of liberty and a symbol of sexual subjection, and this paradox 
is no doubt at least part of the reason why Stowe, on one striking oc-
casion in Lady Byron Vindicated, figures him in feminine terms. “There 
have been women able to lead their leashes of blinded adorers; to make 
them swear that black was white, or white black, at their word,” Stowe 
observes. “Such an enchanter in man’s shape was Lord Byron” (LB 84). 
Most immediately, Stowe is referring here to Byron’s uncanny ability to 
command the admiration of other men, even those whom, like Walter 
Scott, he might have previously insulted. But Byron’s femininity, given 
the larger context of feminine self-slavery that hangs over Lady Byron 
Vindicated, is surely meant by Stowe to be seen as not a little pathetic, 
as well. For Stowe, the coquettish woman, even one able to reduce a 
company of men to a coffle that she can lead about as she pleases, is still 
the greater slave, still subject to those social dictates that give her the 
illusion of control but that nevertheless render her complicit in her own 
unwitting imprisonment. And if women can be understood to enjoy their 
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enslavement and do the work of their masters for them, then perhaps 
even Lord Byron—feminine “enchanter” that he is—can become the 
very sort of stifling master he claims in his poetry to despise. 
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